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The concept of political system gives rise to the notion
that in every political arrangement there are certain func¬
tions that must be performed if the system is to be maintained.
In his work on political systems, David Easton points out that
this concept permits these functions, e.g, interest aggregation,
interest articulation, conversion, or decision-making to be
clearly identified and to be abstracted from the complex of
1
interpersonal interactions which comprise human endeavors.
A political scientist well grounded in the precepts of
political systems and their functions should therefore be able
to isolate and identify the critical functions within any
political arrangement, be it a formal arrangement such as the
legislative system of some specified nation, or an informal
small group political arrangement such as the governing board
of a bridge or bowling club. While contemporary political scien¬
tists are generally called upon to provide colleges and graduate
schools with political science instructors and to supply infor¬
mation on the characteristics of various political systems and
factors affecting policy outputs, the preceding observations
should suggest an additional dimension to the tasks of political
scientists.
^See D. Easton, The Political System, (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1964'n
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Political scientists should be prepared to analyze
political arrangements, abstract from those arrangements the
critical fxanctions, and advise the sponsoring group as to the
proper course of action to pursue in order to achieve their
objectives within the political system under examination.
Using his knowledge of the critical fxinctions common to all
political systems, the political scientist ought to be able to
assess the impact of actions of the participants in the political
process upon the abstracted political system and to calculate
optimum strategies for achieving goals favorable to specified
participants in that political system.
This new dimension in political science research efforts
is particularly important to Black people caught up in the
struggle for liberation and survival in the United States.
Black people have been too often the objects of study and too
seldom the subjects. In a political system that appears to
respond only to highly organized and politically effective
2
groups. Black people, so often unorganized or at best loosely
organized, have been considered a special case by political
science researchers to be examined in light of the effects
upon them of certain governmental agencies and/or policies.
Otherwise, the special needs of Black people have been subsumed,
mitigated, and where possible, eliminated, lander the rubric of
input-demands of the American people into the American political
system.
2
Theodore Lowi, "Interest Group Liberalism", American
Political Science Review, March, 1967, pp. 5-24.
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Groups such as ghetto residents, Black families, or Black
workers, in so far as they espouse goals which may be achieved
through political systems, should be conceived of and come to
conceive of themselves as actors influencing political systems
rather than simply as objects being acted upon by political
systems. Black people must begin to view political systems with
an eye to using those systems to obtain whatever goals they col-
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lectively desire. And in order to enhance the chances of suc¬
cess of the efforts of loosely organized or unorganized Black
groups within the political systems, strategies need to be
evolved and analyzed with an eye toward increasing the political
effectiveness of those Black groups within their respective
political systems.
This is one logical and legitimate task for the Black
political scientist. To understand the desires of Black groups,
to analyze and abstract the critical functions of the political
systems that encompass those Black groups, and to translate the
desires of those Black groups into a politically feasible strategy
for utilizing the resources of those Black groups, whatever they
may be, to affect the political system in such a fashion as to
maximize the chances of securing the objectives of those Black
groups, that is a new orientation in political science than an
oppressed people cannot overlook. It may not be a new direction
in the discipline but is certainly a novel and \mcharted alter-
3
The reader should take care not to simply equate the term
political system with governmental system. Political system as
used here encompasses all political interactions of actors within
a specified system.
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native to the well trod path of dispassioned scholarship and
endless but meaningless quantification.
In this paper, I propose to employ the preceding conceptual¬
ization of a new orientation in political science research in
focusing on the Spring 1970 confrontation between the City of
Atlanta, Georgia, and its preponderantly Black Sanitation Workers.
I will first explore the plight of the workers and attempt to
isolate the goals that motivated the confrontation with the city.
I will then examine the opposing confrontation strategies of the
American Federation of State, Coiinty, and Municipal Employees,
(AFSCME), with particular attention paid to the manner in which
the AFSCME articulated the desires of the workers.
Thirdly, I propose to have a few words concerning the effec¬
tiveness of the AFSCME's strategy in securing the goals of the
workers and finally, I hope to suggest an alternative strategy
%
that I contend would have enhanced the chances of success of the
workers in achieving their goals.
I shall suggest in this paper that the leadership of the
AFSCME was dysfixnctional to the aspirations for higher wages of
the waste collectors for at least two different reasons: 1) the
union's involvement obscured the racial nature of the City-waste
collector confrontation, thereby allowing the City to continue
to exploit the workers under the guise of anti-unionism, and 2)
the vinion demonstrated an inability to organize effectively for
the prosecution of the waste collector's wage demands against
the City.
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Before advancing these propositions, however, it might
prove helpful to provide the reader with a contextual framework
through which to view the case under study and further, to
advise the reader of the methodological considerations employed
in researching this paper. The following pages of this section
are intended to serve this purpose.
One of the central assumptions of a society predicated upon
cultural or ethnic pluralism within a democratic context is that
various groups within that society may ally with various other
groups to form the majority on issues vital to the allied groups.
Alexis DeTocqueville once observed that American society functioned
well precisely because it allowed its citizens to pursue their
4
"self-interest, rightly understood. " If we transfer this con-,
cept of "self-interest, rightly understood" to the allegedly
pluralistic contemporary American society, we might envision a
society in which various groups participate in shifting alliances
for the purpose of advocating measures favorable to the alliance
partners.
It has been suggested that the Negro-Labor Alliance is one
such classic alliance. Indeed, history has taught us the effec¬
tiveness of a forged alliance between Black organizations and
organized labor. Witness, for example, the election of Harry
Truman in the 1948 presidential election as an outgrowth of the
Negro-Labor Alliance within the Democratic Party. With the mer¬
ger of the AFL and the CIO in 1955 and the resulting combined
4
A. DeTocqueville, Democracy In America, (Vols., New York:
Vintage Books, September, 1954), p. 342.
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labor membership of fifteen million, including one and a half
million Blacks, one could well imagine the birth of an important
and dynamic new force for promoting change in directions favor¬
able to the working man and to Black people.
In February, 1965, Bayard Rustin wrote:
"The future of the Negro struggle depends on
whether the contradictions of this society can be
resolved by a coalition of the progressive forces
which become the effective majority in the United
States. I speak of the coalition which staged the
March on Washington, passed the Civil Rights Act,
and laid the basis for the Johnson landslide -
Negroes, trade unionists, liberals, and religious
groups."5
Julius Jacobson, however, in an essay entitled "Union
Conservatism: A Barrier to Racial Equality," points out that the
labor movement has failed to demonstrate the same radicalism
and forcefulness when confronted with Black demands that they
6
exhibited when advocating labor demands. Jacobson correctly
asserts that labor vinions, having gained power and prestige,
have become conservative, if not outright resistive, in the
face of Black demands for the means to economic sufficiency. A
brief survey of the history of the Negro-Labor Alliance will
illviminate the veracity of Jacobson's assertions.
The germination of the labor union movement in the United
States argued ’ against its effectiveness as an advocate for
Black rights. The American Federation of Labor (AFL), the
parent organization of the AFSCME, was founded essentially as
5
B. Rustin, "From Protest to Politics", Commentary, February,
1965) , p. 17.
^See J. Jacobson, "Union Conservatism: A Barrier to Racial
Equality", The Negro and The American Labor Movement, (New York:
Dovibleday and Company, Inc., 1968), p. 14.
7
a federation of affiliated craftsmen organized according to
their various skills. In the 1920's when massive corporation
sponsored drives for open shops destroyed the industrial union
movement and caused a decline in the long established craft
unions, the AFL affiliates which managed to survive were the
racist-dominated imions such as those in the building trades.
Ironically, the first unions to succumb to the anti-\anion
campaigns were the all-Black local unions directly affiliated
with the Executive Council of the AFL.
After the stock market crash of 1929 abated the severity
of the anti-union drives and the unskilled, culturally divided
immigrant workers of earlier decades gave way to a new culturally
integrated work force, the drive to establish labor unions in
the mass-production industries was revived.
Though the leadership of the AFL successfully resisted this
drive and climg to the principle of craft organization, the agi¬
tation within the AFL for industral xjnionism continued and in
1937, the AFL expelled the instigators of that agitation for
industrial unionism, the Committee for Industrial Organizations
headed by the President of the United Mine Workers, John L. Lewis.
The Committee for Industrial Organizations, which after its ex¬
pulsion from the AFL became the Congress of Industrial Organiza¬
tions (CIO), had recognized that a significant percentage of the
laborers in mass production industries were Black and sought
their support. After its expulsion, the CIO, committed to so¬
cial programs and political campaigns designed to improve the
lot of the worker in mass production industries, continued to
8
solicit support from Black workers and Black organizations.
Accordingly, its early legislative programs gave a high prior¬
ity to civil rights causes.
This alliance of Black organizations and the CIO survived
the war, Harry Truman, the McCarthy era, and on into the merger
of the AFL and the CIO in 1955.
As was previously noted, the merger of the AFL and the CIO
promised an effective new weapon for both the movement for labor
rights and the movement for Black rights. For Black people,
that promise has dimmed considerably as a result of siabsequent
developments, among which are: 1) the AFL-CIO's refusal to en¬
dorse the 1963 March on Washington, 2) its repudiation before
a House Judiciary Committee in 1963 of the concept of preferen¬
tial hiring for Blacks, 3) its repudiation in 1966 of Black
Power concepts, and 4) its failure to rid its affiliates and
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locals of racially discriminatory practices. This last devel¬
opment becomes particularly selling if one considers that
whereas the AFL-CIO quite effectively waged campaigns against
communism in 1950 and against corruption in 1955 by expelling
the offending iinions, it has seen fit to attack the problem of
discriminatory practices in its local unions not by expelling
the offending unions but by calling for Congressional legisla¬
tion to correct the racial inequities within its ranks.
7
For expanded treatment of these indictments, see
J. Jacobson, The Negro and the American Labor Movement, (New York
Doubleday & Company, 1968), pp. 12-21.
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As the 1970's unfold, the value for Black people of the
Negro-Labor Alliance becomes suspect. We must call into ques¬
tion that point at which the U.S. labor movement becomes dys-
fiinctional as a vehicle for the pursuit of Black aims within
the U.S. economy.
In the case under study, Black waste collectors in the
City of Atlanta attempted to use the AFSCME as a vehicle for
pursuing wage increases from the City. The sanitation workers
went on strike twice in the space of twenty-one months, the
second strike lasting thirty-six days and attracting national
attention.
Central to the goals of the striking waste collectors was
the demand for a "livable" wage. As a result of the first
strike in 1968, the waste collectors, along with the rest of
the City's pioblic employees, were granted a two-step pay raise
approved by the Board of Alderman on December 15, 1969, to
8
become effective in January, 1970. A step is equal to 4.3%
of the present wage and a two-step pay increase is, therefore,
an 8.6% increase in the worker's pay. However, since the rate
of inflation in the United States at the time of this study
was estimated about between 6% and 7% annually, this raise
offered by the City simply allowed the waste collector to break
9
even and did not measurably improve his financial situation.
O
The Atlanta Constitution and Journal, March 18, 1970, p. 1.
9
Bureau Of Labor Statistics, Statistical Abstract,
Government Printing House, Washington, D.C.: 1970.
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The waste collectors ended the second strike by accepting
an offer from the City of one additional one-step pay increase.
This raise, in dollars and cents terms, raised the Waste Collec¬
tor I's weekly take home pay from $74.20 to $78.79, or to
$4,097.08 annually. This annual figure was just $542.08 above
the 1968 poverty level threshhold for non-farm families as
established by the Social Security Administration and as Atlanta's
Commvinity Relations Commission pointed out, if one considered
state and federal taxes and the increases in the cost of living
since 1968, the poverty threshhold would probably have been
10
crossed by the Waste Collector I and his family.
If we note that the striking waste collectors who remained
off the job through the entire thirty-six day strike period lost
11
upwards of $500 in wages during that period and that even
after the settlement of the strike they were still living at
or below the poverty threshhold, it becomes clear that the
AFSCME was not effective in securing a "livable" wage for the
waste collectors.
What I am going to suggest is that the AFSCME was not only
ineffective in prosecuting the waste collector's fight for a
livable wage, but that, in fact, its leadership of that fight
was dysfunctional to the wage aspirations of the waste collectors
for at least two reasons, namely: 1) the union's involvement
10
Commuinity Relations Commission, "The Human Aspects of
Atlanta's Waste Collection System", A Report Prepared By The
Commianity Relations Commission of Atlanta, Ga. , (Atlanta: May 28,
1970) , p. 24.
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Interview with Rev. John Elders, one of Atlanta's Sani¬
tation Division Personnel Recruiters, July 1, 1970.
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obscured the racial nature of the City-waste collector con¬
frontation thereby allowing the City to continue to exploit the
workers under the guise of anti-unionism, and 2) the \anion
demonstrated an inability to organize effectively for the




The scientific method requires that the researcher bring
as much objectivity as possible to his work. Recognizing the
impossibility of strict objectivity, I feel that it is nonethe¬
less necessary to inform the reader of those biases that I am
conscious of while writing this paper. Let me therefore inform
the reader of the biases I bring to this project and allow him
to make his own judgements as to the extent that this bias has
affected my work and to evaluate the work presented accordingly.
My personal predisposition prior to the initiation of this
project centered on the notion that the sanitation workers had
been caught in the crush of a play for power featuring the City
of Atlanta and the AFSCME. I was frankly skeptical that the
welfare of the sanitation workers was the central concern of
either the City or the union. Subsequent investigation confirmed
my suspicions.
A word about methodological considerations is appropriate
at this point. This work is meant to be an exploratory case
study. It is designed to explore the assertion that the leader¬
ship of the AFSCME in the 1970 Atlanta sanitation strike was
dysfunctional to the aspirations of the City's waste collectors
for higher wages.
It should be understood that I am not attempting to deal
with the wage aspirations or economic deprivation of any of the
City of Atlanta's employees except the 700-plus waste collectors
12
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who provided the muscle required by Atlanta's waste collection
system. The City classified these men as Waste Collectors I
(the men who made the curbside trash pick-ups) and Waste Collec¬
tors II (the men who made the backyard garbage pick-ups). Gen¬
erally, the wage figures discussed in this paper will be those
applicable to the Waste Collector I.
The direction of my research, consistent with current
thought in the social sciences, has been dictated by the commands
of my sxabject.
Several problems present themselves in the researching of
this topic. First of all, the researcher is restricted in his
research methods by the relative recentness of the events in
question. The conflict has been so recently resolved that the
parties to it are still smarting from the confrontation and
their immediacy to the problem not only consciously colors their
testimony but also biases their perception of what has actually
transpired. Objectivity is noticeably lacking in the opinions
of the participants in the confrontation and the investigator
is required to carefully sift through the conflicting stories
in order to arrive at a reasonable explanation of what has
occurred.
Another implication of the immediacy of the examined event
is the lack of published material about it. Accounts of the
strike and the activities attendant to it must be gleaned from
newspaper and magazine articles and from eyewitness testimony.
No books or other comparable published materials have as yet
been forthcoming and even those unp\±)lished reports available
14
which center on some facet of the City-sanitation worker con¬
frontation have been quite scarce.
The primary research tool employed in this study has been
the focused interview. The interview subjects were grouped
into three general categories: 1) City administrative officials,
to include the Sanitation Division administrators and supervi¬
sors, 2) AFSCME leaders and local organizers, and 3) the waste
collectors themselves. A list of questions were compiled for
each general category and the appropriate questions were used
12
to focus the subjects' comments during the interview. Respon¬
dents were encouraged to make whatever comments they felt were
appropriate and an attempt was made to keep the interviews,
especially with the workers, low-key and conversational.
I did not ask the workers to identify themselves and did
not attempt to take notes while the interview was in progress.
Instead, I made mental notes during the interview of the re¬
sponses to certain questions which I had specified in advance.
Immediately after the termination of the interview, I recorded
the responses to the specified questions on a form which I had
previously prepared. Also, notes were made on these forms of
any additional or provocative comments that were worthy of fur¬
ther consideration.
This method of conducting interviews with the waste collec¬
tors undeniably presents some problems of docimentation. I
believe, however, that the enhanced value for an exploratory




the type wherein the names and other critical data about the
si±)ject are recorded will offset the problems arising from
difficulties of documentation.
Another difficulty enco-untered during the researching of
this paper was in obtaining interviews from the workers that
were not obviously influenced either by the union or by the City.
The City's influence was exerted principally through the
selection of persons to be interviewed. Whereas the City did
not require that only certain workers be interviewed, the Sani¬
tation Division suggested, for instance, that I interview a
certain Reverend John Elders, a sanitation worker at the Maddox
Park Sanitation Station. Reverend Elders was said to have
"better insight" into the operation of the Sanitation Division
and to be more "level-headed" than the majority of the sanita-
13
tion workers. I was told that Reverend Elders would be avail¬
able for interviewing at anytime during the day.
The only time suggested for interviewing the other workers,
however, was 3:45 p.m., the end of the workday for the waste
collectors. This procedure becomes doubly objectionable given
the demanding nature of the waste collector's job, the fatigue
it induced, and the fact that the waste collectors generally
proceeded directly from the final stop of the waste or refuge
truck at the sanitation station to their automobiles for the
trip to their homes. The value of an interview conducted by
13 ...
Interview with Atlanta's Sanitation Division
Administrator, James R. Hunnicutt, June 27, 1970.
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stopping a hot, tired, smelly waste collector on his way home
from the job is questionable.
The City administrators themselves, it arranged hierarchi¬
cally, became more cautious and more hesitant to answer questions
as we approached the apex of the hierarchy. The station super¬
visors and lower-level administrators were quite cooperative
and open in responding to the questions asked them. They often
vol\anteered information that proved valuable in the compilation
of this study. The aldermen interviewed, for Atlanta's Board
of Aldermen, were often quite candid in their remarks about the
strike and its ramifications. The City's chief administrators,
however, were more often than not circumspect in their responses
and the mayor, though he provided written responses to my ques¬
tions, was xanavailable for direct questioning.
The pressure exerted by the union was, perhaps, a bit more
subtle. The union officials notified me that shop stewards at
the sanitation stations had been instructed to alert the union
headquarters immediately upon discovering someone in the sta¬
tions questioning the workers and shop stewards were noticeably
present during the interviews conducted in the yard of the
sanitation stations. The workers had become accustomed during
the strike to having to follow instructions on what could and
what could not be discussed with the general public and while
during this investigation that situation no longer existed, there
was still a perceived hesitancy on the part of some of the workers
to discuss certain facets of the strike, particularly the \anion's
role in it.
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Union leaders who played important roles in the strike
and in the negotiations were quite elusive. Jerry Wurf,
International AFSCME President, was stationed in Washington, D.C.
as was Bill Lucey, the union official reportedly responsible
for devising the iinion's strike strategy, and could be reached
only by telephone. Morton Shapiro, AFSCME's southern area
representative, and Jesse Epps, the national AFSCME representa¬
tive sent to Atlanta by the union's national office, were no
14
longer serving in official capacities with the union. The
local AFSCME representatives demonstrated a definite reluc¬
tance to talk candidly about the union's role in the strike
and often referred me to national union representatives for
answers to my inquiries. Of all the persons interviewed, the
union representatives and the local organizers were the most
difficult to obtain responses from.
The difficulties caused by the pressures exerted by the
City and by the union cannot fully be overcome and we must con¬
sequently make allowances for the influenced testimony of the
respondents. Procedures were adopted, however, to lessen the
impact of the biased testimony. The interviews with union
officials and city administrators were conducted as experience
surveys. An emphasis on the insights gained as a result of
functioning in their official capacities tended to lessen the
propagandizing of the officials and often led to the revelation
14
I was able to obtain an interview with Morton Shapiro,
July 17, 1970 American Motor Hotel, Atlanta, and his comments
as a central figure in the City-AFSCME negotiations were quite
instructive.
18
of attitudes or beliefs that would xondoiobtedly influence their
performances during the confrontation.
I attempted to mitigate the pressuring and influencing
effects of the City's and the unions presence on the workers
by structuring the interviews with the workers as I have pre¬
viously described and by manipulating the interview setting.
Whereas the majority of the interviews with the waste collectors
were conducted at the sanitation stations as suggested by the
City's Sanitation Division administrator, I chose to interview
the workers prior to their departure in the mornings. This
was done with an eye to abating the impatience that was apparent
in the interviews of workers at the day's end. Additionally,
appointments were made to interview, under less strained circum¬
stances, workers who seemed receptive and responsive to initial
questioning. In some cases, arrangements were made to conduct
interviews in the homes of the workers. This procedure proved
to be much more productive than interviews held in the yards
of the sanitation stations either in the mornings or at the end
of the work day.
To insure an adequate sampling of opinions of the waste
collectors, interviews were conducted at all three of the regu¬
lar waste collection stations; Maddox Park, Hill Street, and
Liddell Street. Though strict randomness is not required in an
exploratory work such as this one, where possible, I instituted
measures designed to effect a random sample of the subjects to
be interviewed. These measures included selecting interview
siabjects from every second truck that arrived at the sanitation
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station in the afternoons and selecting for interview every
fourth man as they stood around the station yard in the mornings.
A second source of information for this study was newspaper
and magazine articles printed on the s\±»ject. Recognizing the
general mreliability of newspaper articles as unimpeachable
reference sources, these articles, nevertheless, proved inval¬
uable in the presentation of the facts of the confrontation and
in allowing the researcher to get a good grounding in the chron¬
ology of the confrontation. The Southern Regional Council,
located at 5 Forsyth Street, Atlanta, Georgia, maintains newspaper
clipping files on various subjects related to the Black experi¬
ence in the south. Their file on the sanitation strike was
quite extensive and contained articles on the strike published
in prominent national newspapers as well as in all the local
newspapers. I surveyed all of the articles in this file and was
guided in my inquiry in some instances by questions that were
raised in newspaper accounts of the confrontation.
Another source of information, particularly as to the plight
of the waste collectors, was personal experience. I signed on
with the City of Atlanta as a Waste Collector II in order to
get a first hand look at the conditions under which the waste
collectors toil. The time I spent as a waste collector also
allowed me to conduct additional informal but invaluable inter¬
views with the other waste collectors and the driver-supervisors.
A final research tool that merits special note is a report
compiled by the Atlanta Community Relations Commission entitled
"The Hxaman Aspects of Atlanta's Waste Collection System". This
20
report, though authored by an official city conimission, is a
quite objective look at the plight of the waste collector in
the City of Atlanta. The Commission interviewed some sixty
waste collectors in the preparation of their report and although
they restricted themselves exclusively to the himan aspects of
the City-waste collector confrontation, their conclusions were
often valuable in preparing portions of this paper and in
directing this researcher in further inquiry.
CHAPTER II
THE PLIGHT OF ATLANTA'S WASTE COLLECTORS
On April 10, 1970, the Atlanta Constitution ran an edi¬
torial concerning the sanitation strike which read, in part:
"Some supporters of the union have tried to make
the current controversy appear to be a civil rights
struggle.
It's not. It never has been. Several influen¬
tial Black leaders in Atlanta had the political cour¬
age this week to say bluntly that it isn't a racial
question. Among them were Sen. Leroy Johnson, the
Reverend Martin Luther King, Sr., businessman Jesse
Hill, and the Reverend Samuel Williams.
Indeed, there was a great deal of consensus that the
confrontation between the City and the waste collectors was
not a racial matter. Mayor Massell consistently maintained
that anyone attempting to label the strike a racial dispute
simply did not know the Mayor or the City of Atlanta. Even
Morton Shapiro, the AFSCME's southern area representative and
the union's chief negotiator, until his illness, agreed. At
a press conference on the fourth of March, Shapiro told re¬
porters that "the strike is not racial. The issue is not white
The issue is not black. The issue is green."16
In the face of such overwhelming consensus, it would ap¬
pear foolhardy to expend one's time and energies investigating
charges that the strike was largely a racial matter were it
^^The Atlanta Constitution, April 10, 1970, Editorial, p.4
^^The Atlanta Constitution, March 24, 1970, p. 1.
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not for two facts that have not been adequately dealt with
by those disclaiming the racial overtones of the strike.
Those facts are 1) that there was evidence to suggest that
the waste collectors were being exploited by the City of
Atlanta and 2) that the overwhelming majority of the waste
collectors were Black.
A dispute that arises because workers are being exploited
may properly be termed a labor dispute. When, however, the ex¬
ploitation of the workers occurs as a consequence of the race
of the workers, that labor dispute becomes a racial dispute.
In the case under study, we must determine whether or not
the waste collectors were, in fact, exploited by the City of
Atlanta and if so, whether that exploitation could be attri¬
buted to the fact that the waste collectors were overwhelmingly
Black.
I shall begin an exploration of these matters by focusing
on the case of one Reverend John L. Elders, a Black minister
who had worked for the Sanitation Division for twenty-six
years and who was considered a model worker by the supervisory
personnel who administered Atlanta's waste collection system.17
Since Reverend Elders was established by his supervisors as
the ideal employee whose example should be emulated by the other
Black workers, it is important that we examine Reverend Elder's
occupational career and the rewards he accrued as a result of
twenty-six years of diligent and faithful service.
Interview with City Sanitation Division Administrator
James R. Hunnicutt, June 20, 1970.
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Reverend Elders proudly pointed out the fact that he
started working for the City of Atlanta as a waste collector
twenty-six years ago.18 Though he had intended to work for
the Sanitation Division only a couple of weeks, time enough
to earn sufficient finances to meet his expenses, he had dif¬
ficulty locating other work and consequently remained with
the Sanitation Division well past the expected two weeks of
employment.
Reverend Elders rode a garbage truck and collected gar¬
bage for the City of Atlanta for eight years before he was
moved off the truck to an inside job as a custodian. Sixteen
years later, after twenty-four years of service. Reverend
Elders assumed the duties of recruiter-counselor for the Sani¬
tation Division. After suffering a stroke in January, 1970,
Reverend Elders gave up his recruiting duties and took on
minimum duties at the sanitation station.
Reverend Elders felt that he had been different from the
average Black waste collector from the very beginning. He
suggested that he won favor with his supervisors because he
was quiet and did not cause any trouble while working dili¬
gently and responsibly. He believed that Providence probably
caused him to remain in the Sanitation Division past the two
weeks he had expected to work and that he was singled out for
favorable treatment by supervisors because of his Christian
behavior and respectful demeanor.
iSinterview with Reverend John L. Elders, June 29, 1970.
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After twenty-six years of service. Reverend Elders was
still quiet spoken and unassuming. He addressed all men cour¬
teously and never failed to address his white superiors as
'Sir'. He remembered the 'old days' and thought that Black
people had come a long way in Atlanta's Sanitation Division.
He felt that opportunities were beginning to open up for Black
men in the Division but he feared that the younger waste col¬
lectors would not be able to take advantage of the opportuni¬
ties that were presenting themselves. Reverend Elders would
not, for instance, recommend one of the younger Black waste
collectors to replace himself when he retired because he felt
that the younger Black workers were "too hard-headed and easily
influenced." He thought, however, that his accomplishments
should be an inspiration for serious young Black waste collec¬
tors and his exemplary conduct a guide for their actions.
And exactly what were Reverend Elders a-complishments?
What rewards had Reverend Elders received in return for twenty-
six years of conscientious and exemplary service? These ques¬
tions are important if we are to understand what an ideal waste
collector could expect for diligence in service to Atlanta's
Sanitation Division.
Reverend Elders was granted the privilege of opening the
Maddox Park sanitation station. He had keys to the gates and
had to arrive prior to 6:30 a.m. each morning in order to have
the station open when the workers and supervisors arrived later
in the morning. When one of the supervisors wanted someone
outside of the office. Reverend Elders, Preacher as he was
called, was the man who ran and fetched the desired personnel.
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Reverend Elders was permitted to use the desks of some
of the supervisory personnel when they were away from the of¬
fice. When not running errands for the supervisors. Reverend
Elders was responsible for answering the telephones and taking
messages for the supervisors. Additionally, he handled ser¬
vice complaints and dispatched repair vehicles to service sani¬
tation vehicles that broke down along their routes.
In 1968, Reverend Elders assumed the responsibilities
of recruiter-counselor for the Sanitation Division. The po¬
sition was informal and did not entail any reclassification
or increase in salary. Reverend Elders was, however, given
a small expense account for the purpose of entertaining minis¬
ters or community leaders when out*recruiting for the Division.
He was also reimbursed for the cost of gasoline used in making
recruiting trips.
What should be apparent by now is that Reverend Elders
had little to show for his twenty-six years of service to the
City other than those perquisites afforded him by the patron¬
age of his white supervisors and the pension that awaited his
retirement. Reverend Elders, at his retirement, was still
classified and salaried as a Waste Collector II, a garbage
collector. Many of the younger supervisors often consulted
Reverend Elders for information pertinent to their jobs and
the recruiters from the personnel section of the Sanitation
Division sought out his aid in designing their recruiting
practices. But Reverend Elders, at his retirement, was still
a Waste Collector II.
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George Norton signed on with the City of Atlanta as a
waste COHector-driver the same day that Reverend Elders signed
on as a waste collector.19 On July 6, 1970, Mr. Norton retired
as head of the Maddox Park sanitation station. On that date.
Reverend Elders, the ideal Black worker in the Sanitation Divi¬
sion, retired as a Waste Collector II.
Reverend Elders' case was illustrative of certain atti¬
tudes permeating the administrative structure of Atlanta's
Sanitation Division as to what an exemplary worker was and
what his rewards would be but his case was still exceptional.
In a job classification where the annual turn-over rate ap¬
proximated 150%-, a worker who stayed on the job twenty-six
years was definitely not typical and Reverend Elders plight
was certainly not representative of the plight of the average
waste collector.
At this point, we might take a look at the plight of
Atlanta's waste collectors. Just what kind of work was this
"chance to make a living" offered to deprived Black men by
Reverend Elders and Atlanta's Sanitation Division?
The job of waste collector, according to a report from
Atlanta's community Relations Commission entitled "The Human
Aspects of Atlanta's Waste Collection System" is one of the
"last really hard jobs left in this country in terms of the
sheer physical strength it demands."20 The waste collector
Interview with Maddox Park Sanitation Station Supervisor
George Norton, June 29, 1970.
20community Relations Commission Study, 0£. cit., p. 1.
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in the City of Atlanta was expected to walk an average of 10
to 12 miles daily while concurrently lifting and carrying some
5,000 lbs. of waste materials. He had to contend with a sys¬
tem of collection which required him to empty backyard trash
cans of up to 30-gallon capacities into a larger carrying tub
that weighed 14 lbs. 8 ounces when empty and from 60 to 100 lbs.
when full and then lift to his shoulder and carry that carrying
tub to the waiting garbage truck. The walking alone, or the
lifting alone, would require any man to be in excellent phy¬
sical condition, but the two combined plus getting on and off
the truck, pushing the buttons that operate the truck's com¬
pactor, and maintaining a schedule constituted an almost super¬
human task.
The waste collector is commonly subjected to strained
back and neck muscles, abrasions, puncture wounds, lacera¬
tions, insect bites, and the ubiquitous dog bites. The
National Safety Council reports that the collection of mu¬
nicipal solid waste as practiced in the United States has
the highest injury rate of all occupations except logging,
nine times higher, for instance, than industrial workers.
The occupation of waste collector is a "dirty" occupation,
both in the minds of the public and in practice. The collec¬
tion of refuse and garbage under the present collection sys¬
tem is an odious chore. Working directly with or at least
in close proximity to the poorly packaged and contained residues
21 Ibid, p. 4.
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of Atlanta's consumer society necessarily subjects the waste
collector to a myriad of unpleasant sights and scents. This
unpleasantness becomes doubly acute when irresponsible and
presumptuous home owners refuse to do the waste collectors the
courtesy of insuring that their garbage and refuge cans are
in good repair and are not dripping foul-smelling liquids.
The public generally recognizes the dirtiness and un¬
pleasantness associated with the collection of waste materials,
and instead of being appreciative and understanding, it is
contemptuous and condescending. This is clearly perceived
by the waste collectors and the prestige of their calling is
consequently quite low. Not one of the waste collectors in¬
terviewed indicated that he was proud of his occupation or
enjoyed his work and only one of the waste collectors indi¬
cated that there was some liklihood that he might spend his
entire career working for Atlanta's Sanitation Division.
And despite the burdensome working conditions, the suc¬
cessful waste collector must, in a real sense, be skillful
in the accomplishment of his assigned task. The co-owner of
a private refuse collection agency stated:
"Actually, it requires so much skill, alertness,
coordination and physical stamina that many men do
not last through their first full day in this kind
of work. It takes a very good man to stay with it
five days a week."22
Aside from the obvious skills required to manipulate the
large carrying tub, the waste collectors had to operate the
truck's refuse compactor, co-ordinate with the truck driver in
22Ibid, p. 1.
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the movement along the collection route, and master riding
through Atlanta's narrow and bumpy roads and alleys on the
footwide "running board" as the collection truck wound its
way along the treacherous collection routes.
Keep in mind, also, that waste collectors had no training
period during which to master the skills necessary to perform
successfully as waste collectors. Most of the training was
"on the job" and if the waste collector injured himself before
he was able to acquire the skills necessary to cope with his
momentous task, that was merely an unfortunate risk inherent
to the job.
All of this the City of Atlanta asked the waste collector
to endure for a take-home pay that in some instances was as
low as $78.79 per week. If it is not yet clear that the City
of Atlanta was exploiting its Black waste collectors, it may
become so when we contrast that $78.79 weekly take-home pay
with the average $231 take-home pay of the Sanitation Division
administrators and supervisors.23
It is unlikely that anyone who has not lugged a carrying
tub for the City of Atlanta can fully appreciate the plight
of Atlanta's waste collectors. There was a saying among the
waste collectors that if anyone doubted the extremely taxing
nature of their work, there was always an extra tub available.
^^Administrative salary figures were extracted from an
analysis of Current Expense and Revenue of the Sanitation
Division prepared by the Personnel Section of the Sanitation
Division.
30
This would appear to be wise counsel for those aldermen, city
officials. Community Relations Commission members, and even
union officials who would seek to make decisions effecting
the waste collectors or to represent them,
I took advantage of that available carrying tub and signed
on with the City of Atlanta to work as a Waste Collector II.
This was facilitated by the fact that the City always had jobs
available and unfilled as waste collectors and because the
Sanitation Division hired "casual" workers to fill out their
depleted waste collector ranks every Monday and Tuesday, the
days that the worker shortage was traditionally most acute.
The short time that I labored as a waste collector for the
City of Atlanta proved to be a revelation and at the risk of
being unscholarly, I would like to share my impression of that
period with you.
My day as a waste collector began at 6:00 a. m. the morn¬
ing of August 18, 1970. The waste collector's official work
day began at 7:30 when the trucks rolled out of the yard. It
continued until 4:30 in the afternoon with an hour's break for
lunch. The work was continuous with no breaks for coffee or
conferences which marked the working hours of many of Atlanta's
citizens.
The initial shock awaiting me was the stench emitted from
the business end of the garbage truck. I had observed the
waste collectors riding about the City on their rounds and con¬
sequently had some idea that the waste collectors were posi¬
tioned on the rear end of the garbage truck as it sped through
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the City. I was, however, unprepared for the stench from the
rear end of the truck that welcomed me to the profession. And
the sight of millions of little maggots attempting to crawl
out of the curved rear end of the truck did little for my di¬
gestion. Determined to persevere, however, I threw my carrying
tub into the rear end of the truck atop the maggots and in due
course we were ready to depart.
My first mistake was to assume a position directly to the
rear of the compactor end of the truck. The position I chose
left me staring directly into the open end of the truck...when
I chose to open my eyes. What was a larger calamity, however,
was the fact that this position afforded me no relief from the
overbearing stench when the truck was -in-motion. If I was to
breathe at all, I had to inhale the stench from the truck and
to inhale that odor is only slightly less discommodious than
not inhaling at all.
In due time the truck arrived at the first collection
site and following the directions of the driver-foreman, I
walked up a dirt alley to begin my tenure as a waste collector
for the City of Atlanta. The driver-foreman advised me not to
try to work too fast, to pace myself, because this job would
become very tedious by that afternoon. The truth of his state¬
ment was to become all too apparent too soon.
After a short walk up to the dirt alley I spotted three
garbage cans. At this point it seemed a simple matter of trans¬
ferring the garbage from the garbage cans to the carrying tub
and then taking the carrying tub back to the waiting truck
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where I would empty it. Or so I thought.
As I approached the cans they appeared neat enough. They
were chained together and neatly aligned atop several construc¬
tion blocks. My problems began almost immediately as I lifted
the lid of the first can. If the odor from the truck was over¬
bearing, the odor that met me as I lifted the lid of the can
was staggering. I immediately slammed the lid back on the
can and attempted to steady myself. Cautiously, I lifted the
lid once more and emptied the contents of that can into my
carrying tub. The second tub was too unwieldy to handle so
I attempted to lighten the load before emptying it by removing
the package on the top of the load.
It turned out that the package on top was a paper bag
containing about an equal portion of rotting butter beans and
maggots. Of course, the bottom of the bag had rotted away
and it fell apart as soon as I lifted it, spilling the contents
all over the garbage can, the carrying tub, the ground and, of
course, myself. After repairing the damage I had done, I emp¬
tied the third can into the carrying tub and prepared to carry
the tub back to the truck.
At this point, I encountered another problem. Though
the carrying tub was less than three-quarters full, I could
not budge it. There was no way for me to get my carrying tub
to the truck; I couldn't even lift it. It seems that the waste
collector is required to skillfully estimate the weights of the
various items of refuge and garbage he puts into his carrying
tub. Overestimate the weight in the tub and the waste collector
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can dovible the amount of walking he is required to do back
and forth from the truck to the collection points. Underesti¬
mate the weight of the garbage and one is confronted with an
excessively burdensome physical task or, as in my case, a phys¬
ically impossible task. Fortianately, one of my fellow workers
spied my plight and helped me drag the carrying tub to the truck.
My next dilemma came as I was about to become confident
of my ability to master the technique prescribed for successfully
handling the carrying tvib. This technique required that the
handler, after filling the tiob with garbage, swing the tub from
the ground in a circular arc such that the depression in the
bottom of the plastic carrying tub landed on the carrier's left
shoulder. For a right handed carrier, this meant that the right
hand would wind up grasping the ti±) at the top rim with the tub
sitting on the left shoulder. The left hand was placed on the
left hip so that the left shoulder became a more stable platform
to support the weight of the t\ab.
Just as I was mastering this technique I discovered that
there was a catch to the process. I had loaded my carrying
tub (being very careful not to overload it) and was in the pro¬
cess of swinging the carrying tub up to my left shoulder. Just
as the tub settled in place on my shoulder, out of the corner
of my eye I spied a cascade of garbage sailing over my right
shoulder. It was at this moment that I discovered that the
fact that the carrying ti±) stopped its arc on your shoulder did
not automatically guarantee that the refuge ^nd garbage in the
t\ib was going to stop its arc there also.
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After two hours on the job, I had become fatigued to an
extent that I hadn't known since my early days of training as
a collegiate football player. The work was continuous. There
were no interruptions except occasional breaks to drink cold
water from the tin water can kept in the truck. The only
respites from the constant drudgery were the trips on the
truck from one location to another.
I had really underestimated the two chief enemies of the
waste collector, the weight of the carrying tvib and the walking.
While I could manipulate the weight of the carrying tub by
regulating the amount of garbage and trash I put in the tub,
there was no way to minimize the walking. The garbage cans
are generally placed far in the rear of the private households
out of sight. Often, there are alleys that run past the rear
of a series of houses and the waste collector must tread these
alleys to ply his trade. I found these alleys to be overgrown
with weeds, dotted with low hanging tree limbs, and generally
cluttered with all manner of refuge and discarded junk.
Add to these general discomforts unfriendly dogs, bugs and
insects of all descriptions, partially hidden ruts and holes
in the paths, and homeowners who insist on putting liquefied
or excessively heavy waste materials in their garbage cans and
you have some idea of the plight of the waste collector for the
City of Atlanta, Georgia.
As we stopped for lunch I surveyed myself. I was stained
with every sort of foul smelling odor imaginable. The stench
that had been so prominent a part of my early experiences with
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the garbage truck now seemed permanently attached to my cloth¬
ing. The gloves that I wore bore evidence of all of the morn¬
ings misadventures. One of the small itiiseries I discovered was
getting an itch on the nose and being tmable to scratch it be¬
cause eveiY single inch of my clothing, to include my gloves
and my sleeves, was permeated by the juices and odors of Atlanta's
waste materials. A larger misery was the thought of trying to
eat lunch while drenched in the liquid residues and engulfed
by the stifling stench that was so prominent a feature of
Atlanta's waste collection system.
As I resigned my position at lunchtime of the first day,
I could not help but wonder how anyone could constantly accept
the mental and physical abuse that is the lot of the waste
collector. What could possibly motivate a man to return day-
after-day to the fatigue and drudgery that marks the waste
collector's labors?
The answer was put most simply by Charles Scott, the fore-
man-driver of the garbage truck on which I worked. He argued:
If a man can find a job doing anything else,
he shouldn't be collecting garbage. This is the
hardest and the dirtiest work there is. The only
time I'd tell anybody to work here (collecting
garbage) is when they couldn't find anything else
because it will stop people from garnishing your
property if they know you work for the City and
here there's always work and you don't have to
woriry about being laid off like some jobs."^'*
After my very brief tenure as a garbage collector for the
City of Atlanta I agree with Mr. Scott that a man should not
24
Interview with Charles Scott, August, 1970.
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collect garbage for Atlanta if he can do anything else. In
my own mind, I am not sure that it would not be better not to
work at all than to labor imder the conditions that confront
Atlanta's waste collectors. The mental and physical degradation
to which one is subjected is awesome. And lest the reader
think that time and experience would substantially mitigate the
severity of the waste collector's plight, I offer the lament
of one of my fellow workers, an ex-convict from Georgia's chain
gang known to me only as Shorty. In response to my question
of whether collecting garbage got easier after you had worked
at it for awhile. Shorty replied; "Man, I've been working here
for six months and it ain't got no easier yet. And it ain't
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gonna get no easier until you either quit or die".
The men recruited to occupy the exploited and abused
positions as waste collectors for the City of Atlanta were
invariably poor and almost as invariably Black. When confronted
with this fact. City Sanitation Division administrators
emphatically denied that Atlanta's waste collection system was
designed to prey unemployed and loneducated Black men. An
investigation of the City's waste collector recruitment practices,
however, yielded an opposite conclusion.
In the Slimmer of 196 8 the Sanitation Division adopted an
interesting innovation in its recruitment policy. Because of
the general ineffectiveness of the three white personnel super¬
visors assigned to the sanitation stations, the Division infor-
Interview with "Shorty", August, 1970.
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mally appointed three Black workers as recruiters, one from
each of the sanitation stations. I refer to these appointments
as informal because they entailed neither changes in the job
classifications of the involved workers nor pay increases. '
The Black men were appointed, according to Mr. Hunnicutt,
one of the City's chief Sanitation Division administrators,
because "they could speak the language" of the men the Division
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hoped to recruit. Of three informal recruiters and the three
personnel supervisors, only Reverend Elders was successful in
recruiting personnel to fill the vacant waste collector positions.
Because of his success. Reverend Elders became the Division's
primary recruiter, still operating in a non-official capacity,
of course, and the other recruiters were encouraged by the
Division to pattern their recruiting practices after the methods
devised by Reverend Elders.
A look at the recruitment methods devised by Reverend Elders
and \inofficially adopted by the Sanitation Division will reveal
the extent to which Black men exclusively were recruited for
the job of waste collector.
Tenet number one of Reverend Elder's recruitment philosophy
was to seek out unskilled, uneducated, and if possible, unem¬
ployed Blacks for recruitment to the ranks of the City's waste
collectors. The Reverend normally made recruiting trips to
the rural Black churches up to fifty miles away from Atlanta
where he rounded up recruits by annoimcing the openings with
the Division during the church services and by receiving tips
26 .....
Interview with City Sanitation Division Administrator
James R. Hiinnicutt, June 20, 19 70.
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on potential recruits from the church officials. He often
entertained church officials with fvinds provided him for that
purpose by the Division.
Reverend Elders revealed that in approaching potential
recruits he often had to "dress up the job" because his early
experiences had taught him that many Blacks were reluctant to
consider a position as a garbage collector.
The second prime source of recruits for the Division's
waste collector positions was low-rental housing units occupied
totally or predominately by Blacks. Reverend Elders had hand¬
bills printed which announced the job vacancies in the Division
and distributed these handbills in Black-occupied apartment
buildings and occasionally in businesses frequently by Black
people. Here again, the emphasis of this phase of the recruiting
campaign was to locate young vinemployed and imskilled Black men
to serve the City as waste collectors.
When asked what, if anything, he would change about his
recruiting program if he had it to do over. Reverend Elders
commented that he would probably have had larger signs printed
to go in the windows of several prominent business establishments
in the Black communities of Atlanta. When asked why he con¬
centrated his recruitment efforts on Blacks, Reverend Elders
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replied that he had never really given the matter any thought.
27
Interview with Reverend John L. Elders, July 2, 1970.
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Table I is a racial break-down of the personnel employed
2 8
by the Atlanta's Sanitation Division as of May, 1970.
Table I
Total
Position Personnel White/Black Ratio % Black
1. Adminis trators 13 13/0 0%
2. Supervisors 52 50/2 3%
3. Waste Collec¬
tor: Drivers 2 30 100/130 56%
4. Waste Collectors 714 32/6 72 95%
This table readily reveals that Blacks had been impressed
at the bottom of the scale while whites exclusively occupied
the upper echelons. Blacks comprised 95% of the system's
muscle, the waste collectors, while the administrators were
100% white. It should be sufficient commentary that in a system
which employed 804 Black men and 195 white men, only two Black
men, that is 26/100 of one per cent of the Black men employed
by the Sanitation Division, had been able to attain the class¬
ification of supervisor or above while 63 white men, or 33 1/3
of the white men employed, were employed in positions as super¬
visors or above.
But these figures do not tell the whole story. Indeed,
they tend to understate the case for racial exploitation in
Atlanta's waste collection system.
One must remember that the figures used to construct Table I
were supplied by the City. My observations led me to conclude
that the City's figures give an inflated notion of the number of
white men actually working as waste collectors for the City of
2 8
This table was constructed using figures supplied by
the Personnel Section of Atlanta's Sanitation Division.
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Atlanta. I discovered that a large percentage of those few
white waste collectors one might observe working on the City's
refuge trucks were 'casuals', workers hired on a day-to-day
basis to supplement the Division's regular work force.
Additionally, some of the allocated waste collector positions
had been assigned to white persons who were in fact working on
special projects or in special programs for the City. The
Sanitation Division invariably had an excess of waste collector
position vacancies so this procedure did not adversely affect
the work force of the Division. It did, however, create con¬
fusion for the researcher when these persons were counted as
waste collectors because the positions they occupied were
allocated waste collector positions.
I should point out also that while I have separated the
waste collector drivers from the waste collectors to denote
their driver-foreman function, the pay scale of the waste
collector driver was indistinguishable from that of the other
waste collectors.
In defense of the racial composition of its hierarchy.
Sanitation Division administrators suggested that the racial
imbalance found in the Sanitation Division resulted from de¬
funct policies of racial discrimination which prevented Blacks
from holding supervisory positions in any division of the City
prior to 1961. They pointed out, for instance, that the Division
promoted Black men in the Division to the status of waste
collector for the first time in June, 1961, when four Blacks
assumed that position. VJhen this investigation was conducted.
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there were 130 Black waste collector drivers and two Black
supervisors.
Administrators suggested that more progress toward allevi¬
ating the racial imbalance in the Sanitation Division hierarchy
would be made as Blacks became qualified and applied for vacant
supervisory positions.
Whether or not the presence of two Black supervisors in
Atlanta's waste collection system represented progress was clearly
debatable, the more important question, however, was whether
Atlanta's promotional system would, in fact, facilitate the
ascendency of Blacks into the administrative hierarchy of
Atlanta's Sanitation Division. It is this latter question we
shall deal with presently.
In order to qualify for promotion to assistant inspector
or inspector, the lowest level supervisors, the waste collector




The failure of any one of the three parts of this examina¬
tion was sufficient to disqualify the applicant from considera¬
tion. A cursory analysis of the examination program provides
sufficient evidence of its potential bias against the typical
Black waste collector.
The evaluation interview was conducted by representatives
of the Personnel Division and though often conducted by evaluators
from outside of the division or department to which the applicant
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was assigned, was generally felt to be largely objective.
The written test was a coiranon sense, multiple choice test
used by each of the City's divisions in testing for foreman-
level promotions. It required average reading ability and a
reasonable level of literacy. One should not ;mderestimate
the difficulty of this written test, however, because several
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Black college graduates were known to have failed the test.
Considering the low level of literacy achieved by the majority
of the waste collectors, it would appear that they stood little
chance of passing the written examination without some addi¬
tional educational assistance.
The City of Atlanta did offer its employees a training
program designed to provide them with a basic eighth grade
education. Unfortvinately, the classes were held weekdays during
the late afternoon and early evening hours. After working a
full day, the waste collectors were generally so fatigued that
they would have had to be exceptionally motivated to attend
the classes. And regrettably, even when the waste collectors
were sufficiently motivated to attend the classes, because per¬
haps of their extremely fatiguing work, they proved not very
receptive to the instruction.
The efficiency rating was left to two white Sanitation
Division employees who held inspector level jobs or above.
They had absolute discretion about whether or not a man passed
his efficiency rating and could fail a man simply because they
felt he was not 'promotion material'. This discretionary power
29
Interview with Reverend Elders, July 2, 1970.
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of the white inspectors takes on enhanced significance when
we recall that a failure on any of the three parts of the
examination would disqualify the applicant for the entire
examination.
Even in the most arduous occupation a worker might reason¬
ably expect to be able to escape the rigorous labors through
the promotion system. The best commentary on the promotion
system of Atlanta's Sanitation Division was the two Blacks
holding supervisory positions in the Division. In a system
employing 806 Blacks, this represented tokenism in its highest
form.
This investigation of the plight of Atlanta's waste collec¬
tors yielded the following conclusions:
1) that Black men were specifically recruited to perform
the very vital function of collecting Atlanta's waste materials,
2) that those Black men were subjected to innumerable
indignities and abuses in the performance of their jobs, not
the least of which were the excessive physical demands of the
job and the demoralizing, 'non-livable' wage they received,
3) that Black men were impressed in the lower echelons
of the waste collection system and could not reasonably hope to
improve their lot through the promotion system.
The fact is that the Black man has been subjected in this
country to the debilitating influences of slavery, discrimina¬
tion, and deprivation. The waste collection system of the City
of Atlanta operated on the premise that the Division could lo¬
cate and exploit Black men who had been thusly deprived.
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Despite the protestations of the Mayor, the union negotia¬
tors, and the assorted "Negro leaders" then, I would like to
suggest that the confrontation between the City and its waste
collectors was, indeed, at its base, a racial conflict.
CHAPTER III
THE AFSCME'S CONFRONTATION STRATEGY
In the confrontation between the City and the union,
the primary weapon utilized by the union was the strike and
associated protest activities. Michael Lipsey in "Protest
As A Political Resource" provides us with the means for
evaluating the effectiveness of the union's efforts.
Lipsey argues that "the essence of political protest con¬
sists of activating third parties to participate in contro-
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versy in ways favorable to protest goals." He diagrams
his conception of the process of protest by relatively
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powerless groups as follows:
TABLE II
30m. Lipsey, "Protest As A Political Resour«pe", American
Political Science Review (Vol. LXII, No. 4, Washington, D.C.:
American Political Science Association, December, 1968),
pp. 1153-1163.
^^Ibid., p. 1153.
32 Ibid., p. 1154. 45
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Central to Lipsey's thesis is the notion that protest
is used by relatively powerless groups to gain political re¬
sources with which to bargain with target groups by causing
a third party to influence the target group in directions
favorable to the relatively powerless group. In the con¬
frontation under examination, the principal actors required
by Lipsey's model are easily identified. The protest con¬
stituents are the Black sanitation workers, doubly powerless:
1) because they are part of a Black minority that has tradi¬
tionally been powerless in an American society that has
exploited and disadvantaged them as a race, and 2) because
they are but a small segment of that Black minority community.
The protest leader is the AFSCME leadership. The target group
is clearly the City administration headed by Mayor Sam Massell.
This is the group with the power to grant the protesters'
demands and the group with which the protesters must ultimately
come to terms if their demands are to be met. The third party,
the reference public of the target group is Atlanta's populace,
the general public (to include significant institutions in
Atlanta such as the newspapers on the business community).
To evaluate the effectiveness of the protest policy of
the AFSCME, we need simply ascertain the extent to which the
AFSCME's protest strategy and activities motivated the general
public to influence the City administration in directions
favorable to the striking workers.
Some comments by the union leadership regarding their
protest strategy are illustrative of the union leadership's
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failure to proceed in their protest activities in a fashion
calculated to win the support of the referent public, the
citizenry of Atlanta.
Morton Shapiro, the AFSCME's southern area representa¬
tive, announced on the nineteenth of March that the union
would do everything legally possible to inconvenience the
City until the workers got raises, to include a "coffee-in"
by laborers at downtown hotels during a busy hour and a
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"lunch-in" at expensive restaurants. Jesse Epps, a national
union representative sent to Atlanta by the union's national
office, echoed Shapiro's sentiments when he suggested that
the union had planned to "spread the suffering" by going into
downtown restaurants to "stretch our coffee breaks" and into
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clothing stores "to*try on some of them $200 suits". Addi¬
tionally, comments were made to the effect that hospital,
airport, and school employees would be called on to strike
35
when necessary "to close the City down."
This strategy was obviously designed to bring disorder
and discomfort to the reference public in hopes that the
discomfort would prove sufficiently severe to cause the
reference public to bring pressure upon the City to meet the
demands of the union. This strategy proved to be faulty and
ineffective.
^^The Atlanta Journal, March 19, 1970, p. 1.
^^The Atlanta Constitution, March 20, 1970, p. 2.
^^This comment was made by Tom Evans, an AFSCME repre¬
sentative on March 18, 1970. Printed in The Atlanta Journal,
March 19, 1970.
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The Chamber of Commerce voiced the sentiments of most of
Atlanta's business community when they praised Mayor Massell
36
for holding the line against the union's demands. Rather
than bringing pressure upon Mayor Massell to agree to the
union demands, the business sector applauded Mayor Massell's
stance against the union's demands.
No groundswell of protest against the City administration
was forthcoming from the citizenry as a whole either. The
public remained for the most part neutral during the confronta¬
tion. Even in the Black community, there was nothing approaching
widespread support for the striking workers. Whereas local
Black politicians and community leaders were often sympathetic
to the plight of the strikers and their families, they often
accepted the City's contention that it simply did not have
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the money to meet the union's demands.
Aside from the question of the effectiveness of the
union's protest strategy, we might question the effectiveness
of the union leadership itself as protest leaders. Lipsey
suggests that the successful protest leader must have the
capacity for appealing successfully and simultaneously to
four different constituencies: 1) the communications media,
2) the reference public, 3) the target group, and 4) the
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protest constituency.
^^The Atlanta Constitution, March 22, 1970 Article by
Raleigh Bryans.
^^This conclusion was arrived at after extensive inter¬
viewing in the local Black communities and canvassing of the
statements of Black leaders who conunented on the strike.
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M. Lipsey, see op. cit., p. 1156.
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The union attempted to deal with this problem by divid¬
ing the responsibility for appeals to the different constit¬
uencies among its leadership cadre. Morton Shapiro, chief
union negotiator until his illness, had the responsibility
of actually coming to terms with the City administration.
Jesse Epps, who, in the words of Shapiro, was "sent from the
national office to raise so much hell that the City would be
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happy to negotiate with an apparently more rational Shapiro"
and who worked under the direction of Shapiro, had the
responsibility for keeping the protest activities and the
strike in the news and indirectly (through the news media)
for keeping pressure on the referent group. The appeal to
the protest constituency was delegated to Epps and a corp
of indigenous union leaders, i*e. outspoken workers and shop
4. ^ 40stewards.
Having already noted the reaction of the reference pub¬
lic to the union's appeals, I might add that the news media
remained largely neutral on the confrontation and normally
favored the City administration when it took a stand. The
protest constituency responded to the union's appeals by
twice overwhelmingly rejecting settlements that had been
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agreed upon by the union leadership.
Interview with Morton Shapiro, July 17, 1970.
^^An argument could be made that this move was made in
recognition of the fact that the strikers were preponderantly
Black while the local union cadre (that is, union officials,
not workers or shop stewards) were white.
4^The Atlanta Constitution, March 26, 1970, p. 1.
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Still, in the final analysis, the most important gauge
of the effectiveness of the union's protest policies has to
be the reaction of the target group to the union's appeals.
In assessing this reaction. Professor Lipsey provides us
six alternative responses available to target groups short
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of dispensing material satisfactions to the protesting group.
Those alternatives are;
1) Target groups may dispense symbolic satisfactions;
2) Target groups may dispense token material satisfactions;
3) Target groups may organize and innovate internally in
order to blunt the impetus of protest efforts;
4) Target groups may appear constrained in their ability
to grant the protest goals;
5) Target groups may use their extensive resources to
discredit protest leaders and organizations;
6) Target groups may postpone actions.
An examination of the chronology of the confrontation
will disclose that the City opted for every form of alternative
response available during the course of the strike.
The City initially adopted alternatives four and six
concurrently. The City expressed sympathy for the strikers
and promised to consider pay increases for the strikers as
soon as possible during the next fiscal year but argued that
the City simply did not have the money necessary to grant the
worker's demands for pay increases immediately. The City then
attempted to dispense symbolic satisfactions when on March 18,
^“^M. Lipsey, op. cit., p. 1158.
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19 70, the City proposed to increase the minimiom wage from
$1.67 per hour to $2.13 per hour and to provide a $5,000
life insurance policy gratis for the city employees. This
was done despite the fact that the pay raise would have had
no effect on the take-home pay of the vast majority of
striking workers.
After the union membership rejected this offer, the
City attempted to organize and innovate internally to blunt
the impetus of the strike. The City fired the striking workers
and attempted to employ strike-breakers to take the jobs of
the striking workers. The City also hired three private col¬
lection firms and for a short while utilized city prisoners
in an attempt to carry on the City's waste collection functions.
At one point. Mayor Massell suggested that the City could go
on indefinitely with its emergency waste collection system
which featured the City's residents taking their trash to
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central collection points.
While operating under the emergency trash and garbage
collection system, the City attempted to discredit the union
leadership. Mayor Massell was careful not to attack the
striking workers themselves but accused the union leadership
of using the strike to further its own ends. In a statement
made during a televised address to the residents of Atlanta
on March 26, 1970, Mayor Massell said, in part:
^^The Atlanta Journal, March 26, 1970, p. 1.
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My patience has been exhausted, yet my heart
goes out to the worker who has apparently been
made a tool of a small band of power-seeking union
bosses. I regret most sincerely that the worker
and his family are the ones who suffer at the hands
of those who would manipulate them for personal
gain.
He further charged that the union leadership had not
really pushed the settlements that had been worked out in
negotiations with the City when those settlements were pre¬
sented to the rank-and-file union membership. The City
also piiblished in the local newspapers copies of letters
containing agreements with the union which the City claimed
A C
that the union violated.’"^
Finally, the City attempted to dispense token material
satisfactions with its offer of giving $5.00 bonuses to
each of the waste collectors who worked a full five-day
week. There was considerable doubt on the part of the
Sanitation Division administrators who developed the plan
that a large enough number of waste collectors would work
the full five days to make the bonus plan a strain on the
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City financially. Sanitation Division attendance figures
indicated that during the period of this investigation,






Interview with City Sanitation Division Administrator
S. Hunnicutt, June 20, 1970.
^^The Atlanta Constitution, February 25, 1970, Article




One must conclude that the City attempted to dissuade
the strikers from their goals in any manner it could. From
the beginning, the City chose not to deal in good faith with
the union which represented the striking workers. And as
the battle was joined, the City went from one alternative
strategy to another without considering seriously, at least
not publicly, marshalling its resources to grant the demands
of the workers.
That the City felt free to take such liberties during
its negotiations with the union amply demonstrates the
failure of the unions protest strategy to manufacture for
the union political resources as a result of its protest
activities.
The greatest deficiency of the union's strategy, however,
was that it fit so easily into Lipsey's model of a protest
strategy, that is, that it clearly was a protest strategy.
It is somewhat ironic that in an era when the civil rights
protest approach toward the redress of Black grievances is
largely being abandoned by the Black community, this was the
approach adopted by the union to attack what was essentially
a case of racial exploitation.
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The protest strategy, by requiring the protesters to
appeal to a third party, the reference public of the target
group, facilitates the mitigation and redefinition of pro¬
test goals. Instead of directly confronting the City ad¬
ministration with their demands, the workers had to have
their demands articulated in a fashion that would win the
support of the reference public and cause them to apply
pressure to the target group. When the protestors are Black
and the reference group is white and especially when satis¬
faction of the Black demands might require expenditures on
the part of the reference group, considerable redefinition
of the original goals may be required.
In Atlanta, what was originally a plea by sanitation
workers for relief from inhumane working conditions (of which
the "unlivable" wage was a key ingredient) was translated by
the AFSCME initially into a call for higher wages for all
City employees. By articulating the demand in this fashion,
the union seriously jeopardized the original demands of the
waste collectors. The Aldermanic Finance Committee calcu¬
lated that it would cost $2.5 million to grant a one-step pay
raise to all City employees^® and keep in mind also that
since the pay raise is based on a percentage of the present
salary, the bulk of that $2.5 million wage increase would
have gone not to the waste collectors but to other higher
salaried city employees.
^^The Atlanta Constitution, February 25, 1970, Article
by Michael Wright, p. Tl
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And while the union could claim to seek pay increases on
behalf of all City employees, when the union issued its strike
call, of 7,200 City employees, only 2,500 walked off their
jobs. And of the 2,500 that initially walked out, only 925
received the severance checks for staying out on strike even
after the City announced that it would fire the striking
workers who did not return immediately to work. Not surpris¬
ing is the fact that the 925 workers who were fired for refus¬
ing to return to work were made up of 660 Sanitation Division
personnel, 195 Water Department personnel, and 50 Street and
... 49
Sewer Division personnel —the same people who initially
motivated the confrontation.
Later, the union modified its demands to call for pay
raises for the striking workers and acceptance by the City of
the legitimacy of the vuiion as the representative of the
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workers. Some weeks after the strike ended, Morton Shapiro
stated that "the victory (of the striking workers) was one in
which the workers got the City to stick by its agreement to
a one-step pay raise and to recognize the AFSCME as the legiti¬
mate representative of the workers. It was not an economic
51
. , ,
victory but a political one". Whereas to the union leader¬
ship, the political victory might have been significant in
^^The Atlanta Constitution, March 28, 1970, Article by
Alex Coffin, p. 1.
^^The Atlanta Constitution, March 31, 1970, p. 1.
^^Interview with Morton Shapiro, July 17, 1970 (Atlanta).
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some way, to those workers who provided the impetus for the
strike, a political victory that left their financial status
virtually unchanged was a shallow victory indeed.
Of course, even if the protest strategy had succeeded
in securing the original goals of the workers, the workers
would still have been dependent upon the reference group's
responding properly for satisfaction of their future demands.
And Black groups which have become dependent upon white groups
for the articulation and satisfaction of their demands have
historically not met with ovearwhelming success.
What would appear called for is a means of cutting across
the requirement for influencing reference publics and for
gaining direct access to the target group as per Table III.
TABLE III
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In Atlanta I believe this could have been accomplished
had the AFSCME not chosen to suppress and deny the racial
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nature of the workers' exploitation. Had the dispute been
properly defined as a racial dispute with the Black community
organizations assuming an advocatory role in the confronta¬
tion, the City's confrontation strategy would surely have
had to be altered.
Atlanta, "The City Too Busy To Hate", has proven ex¬
tremely sensitive to racial controversies and Mayor Massell,
elected by a coalition which depended heavily on a substantial
Black vote, could hardly afford to confront the Black community
on a racial issue in the same heavy-handed manner in which he
confronted the union on the labor issue. Mayor Massell dis¬
played his sensitivity to racial issues in a televised address
on March 26, 1970. His comments included the following;
There are also efforts to make this a race issue—
which it is not by any stretch of the imagination...
and all men of goodwill know that what I say is a
fact. My credentials prohibit them from tagging me
a racist, and the very fact that their (AFSCME) visit¬
ing officers would suggest this is proof enough that
they know little about our city.^^
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The union officials made a conscious decision at the
beginning of the confrontation to prevent the conflict from
taking on the racial overtones that the strike in 1968 had
taken on. Interview with M. Shapiro, July 17, 1970. On
March 24, 1970, Shapiro stated that "civil rights leaders may
be called in later to assist, but right now, the strike is not
racial". The Atlanta Constitution, March 24, 1970, p. 1.
^^The Atlanta Constitution, March 27, 1970, p. 3. A
reprint of the entire text of Mayor Massell's televised
address on the Sanitation Strike, delivered March 26, 1970.
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In 1968, when a similar sanitation strike took on racial
overtones, the workers received satisfaction of their demands
within three days. Reflecting back on that 1968 strike, Raleigh
Bryans editorialized in The Atlanta Journal Constitution;
In 1968, the strikers by design solicited the broad-
scaled involvement of civil rights individuals and
organizations and succeeded. For a time, the strike
looked more like a civil rights movement than a wage
dispute. (Mayor Ivan) Allen was briefly deserted by
most of his allies in the black community and this
left him for awhile without any about. The strike
was eventually settled—on Allen's terms—because
someone in the civil rights movement decided to avoid
an all-out, racially oriented confrontation.
In the present situation, the strikers clearly
have not garnered the massive civil rights involve¬
ments that they probably anticipated, in light of
their success along these lines in 1968.^^
Atlanta's civil rights organizations certainly appeared
eager enough to enter the fray. At one point. Rev. Ralph
David Abernathy, civil rights activist and head of the Southern
Christian Leadership Council, publicly announced that he was
finding it difficult to constrain his involvement on behalf
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of the striking Black workers. Had the dispute been prop¬
erly defined as a racial dispute rather than as a labor dis¬
pute, however, the vinion probably would not have been able
to maintain leadership of the workers during the confrontation
and consequently would not have been able to claim whatever
credit may have accrued as a result of the settlement. In
this circumstance, it would appear unwise to allow the union
^^The Atlanta Journal/Constitution, March 22, 1970.
^^The Atlanta Constitution, March 26, 1970, p. 1.
59
the option of defining the nature of the controversy. In this
instance, it seems that the striking waste collectors would
have been well-advised to have taken their case to the Black
community on the basis of racial exploitation by the City
rather than commit the advocacy of their cause to the AFSCME.
In the long run, it appears that the interests of the
waste collectors of Atlanta would be better served with the
establishment of an alternative union structure to that of
the AFSCME—a local union based on the community of Black
waste collectors and guided by leadership indigenous to that
community. Such a union would provide the waste collectors
with several benefits not afforded them by the AFSCME.
First of all, such a union should be able to deal ef¬
fectively and simultaneously with both questions of racial
and labor exploitation since both the rank-and-file and the
leadership would be made of Black laborers. It should further
provide for a more precise articulation of the grievances of
the workers by avoiding the calamity of having a non-Black,
non-worker AFSCME hierarchy attempt to define the goals of
the preponderantly Black, predominantly waste collector rank-
and-file membership.
Such a union could take advantage of the indigenous Black
leadership within the Black waste collector community by pro¬
viding for the recruitment of local Black workers into the
unions' leadership roles. The experience and self confidence
that accrues to one by virtue of the occupancy of such leader¬
ship roles would strengthen not only the recruited individuals
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but by strengthening its parts, promote the strength and self-
sufficiency of the overall organization.
Finally, a local union based on the community of waste
collectors would relieve the waste collectors of the burden
of footing the bill for a union apparatus which aspires to
service not only the needs of the waste collectors but of
all City employees.
Of course, these benefits must be assessed in light of
the detrimental effects of disassociating from the International
AFSCME—primarily the disadvantages attendant to losing access
to the resources of AFSCME and the administrative know-how of
the AFSCME officials. What should be understood, however, is
that the required level of both administrative know-how and
resource availability is dependent upon the desired scope of
the organizational activity. Initial limitations of either
administrative know-how and/or resource availability, there¬
fore, should not proscribe the establishment of a local union
based on the community of Black waste collectors but simply
represent the initial constraints upon its organizational
activity.
An examination of the strategy used by the AFSCME in the
1970 Spring Confrontation in Atlanta might appear to be super¬
fluous given that the strike has long since been tentatively
resolved and the overt confrontation abated. This strategy
takes on increased importance, however, with the assumption
that this confrontation is destined to be re-enacted in other
cities throughout the United States.
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The 1970 City-Waste Collector Confrontation in Atlanta
exhibited three readily identifiable characteristics that
have been mirrored in other similar confrontations throughout
the country, namely:
1) The striking workers were for the most part impover¬
ished, poorly paid Blacks;
2) A union was the formal negotiating representative
of the workers;
3) The employer being struck was a municipality.
What remains for subsequent studies is the examination
of the circumstances and strategies employed in confronta¬
tions similar to Atlanta's and the extraction from a com¬
parative analysis of these work generalizations that will
be useful to Black workers engaged in similar confrontations.
APPENDICESI.Union Efforts to Influence the Reference Public
A. Boycott Flysheet
B. Photostat of Protest March AnnouncementII.The City's Effort to Influence the Reference
P\iblic
A. Photostat of Letter Sent by the City to
Community Leaders and Influentials
B. Photostats of News Releases from the City
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ain with us Saturday as we march from the Butler Street YMCA to City Hall to dramatize our grievances against the
ity administration. The mayor has cliosen this week to adopt a "get-tough policy” against the city's lowest ,'d
orkers. He is laboring under the delusion that wholesale jailing of leaders an.d members will end the strike, le is
listaken. Only a decent, livable wage will end the strike. The mayor began the week with heavy-handed, police-state
ictics. We will end it w ith an expression of solidarity and a dramatization of our sole purpose—to win dignity and
istice for all Atlanta city w orkers.






Tel. 572-/.4e3 Aroe Cede /.Ol
SAM MAvSSELL. MAYOR
DAN E. SWEAT, JR., Cliici Aflministrativo Olf:
MRS. NORMA DAY, Executive Secretory
MEMORANDUM
From: Mayor Sam Ma.ssell
t
I
Attached a.re several copies of an ad that ran in some of the Atlanta
papers this week in an effort to get the facts of the current City
employee work sloppa.ge before the people.
Tt wottIci bc; sincerelv annreciated if voa. as
. ; Tiunity, coulci help see tliat these facts
possible circulation.
SM: ja
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The Mayor and Board of Aldermen are elected to rep¬
resent all the citizens of Atlanta. This includes the re¬
sponsibility of seeing that city employees are paid a fair
wage for their labor. It also includes the efficient and
wise expenditure of your tax dollars.
The city government has done both. Employee salaries
were raised significantly this year. The great majority of
workers accepted this increase, A group belonging to a
labor union did not. They have demanded further pay
raises.
The city does not have the money to grant additional
raises in 1970. The state Legislature refused to grant our
major requests for new sources of revenue.
We do not feel that the city should raise property taxes
at this time to grant additional pay raise demands.
A work stoppage results in inconvenience and some hard¬
ships to our citizens. We ask your understanding and
support of our position and efforts to be fair to both our







The following agrcemen}’ was reached and signed by the Mayor
and officials of the American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees on Tuesday, March 17, 1970. The union
representatives were unable to get the support of their member¬
ship for the provisions In the agreement they had signed.
V/g, the undersigned, hereby express our position of
ogreement on the following matters with regard to employ¬
ment under the City of Atlanta with the understanding that
we will diligently make these recommendations to our res¬
pective memberships:
1. Thot the minimum wage for employees of the City of
Atlanta shall be increased to $2.13 per hour effective
on the first pay period following the next regular meet¬
ing of the Board of Aldermen.
2. Thot each City employee be provided 55,000 of life
insurance coverage free of cost to the employee within
the present insurance plan, replacing the premium con¬
tribution now being made by the employee toward
$2,500 coverage, to be mode effective on or around
July 1, 1970.
3. Thot oil employees who are absent without official
leave on this date will return to work ot the next reg¬
ular work day without pay for time obsent during the
work stoppogc.
This 17th day of Morch, 1970.
The above statement was signed by representatives of
the city and tbs union after reaching accord on the obove






Thci foHov/ing fetcer v/os {crv/ardccl io {-he
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It is the desire" o" our L'nicn to have a har-cnious relaticn->
ship v.'ith the nev.' Administration, therefore,'v,'e suggest the
negotiation of a three (,'3} year agreer.ent to be effective
as of Oanuary 1, 1371.
'.-'a further pledge that •.•.’e v.’ill noit'’.cr supoort,- encourage or
condone any general work stonpace during the negotiations.^
In the event that we reach an. imeasse, v.e agree to the use
of Fact Finding Cc"rnttee, Federal I'.ediatio.'i Service and/cr
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The City has been fair. Since 1962, the City of At-
lonta has increased your salaries by .47.3 per cent. Dur¬
ing this period, the cost of living increased by only 22.6
per cent according to the U.S. Department of Labor. Ef¬
fective the first of this year—just o few v/eeks ago—the
City granted at least an SV2 per cent pay increase to all
employees and many received a 12 per cent increase at
a total cost to the City of Atlanta taxpayer at $4.8 mil¬
lion.
Those of you who have abandoned your jobs are
endangering your civil service status, your fringe bene¬
fits, your rights under the city pension program, and
many other rights and benefits you have as a permanent
city employee.
It would be to your advantage to return to work





is a story of a Mayor and a Garbage Collector.
Sam, the Mayor, had a long track record of helping poor
people and he was quick to admit that almost all Garbage
Collectors were poor. Thus, when Sam v/as elected to
office eight years ago (it was Vice Mayor, then) he helped
pass salary increases and other benefits for Garbage
Collectors.
Don v/as a Garbage Collector who went to work for this
City at that same time (1962) for what amounted to $47. 00
in pay for a 40-hour week. In 1963, he received $ 58. 75;
in 1964, $61.75;
in 1965, $ 66. 50;
in 1966, $ 72.25;
in 1967, $ 82.00;
in 1968, $ 89. 25; '
in 1969, $101.25;
in January of 1970, $110. 00;
and with the bonus next month, Don will begin receiving
$115. 00 per week!
Of course, a.11 along Don has also continued to receive
increased fringe benefits and improved working conditions.
Sam respects Don and appreciates the fact that he (Don) is
doing a dirty job that is very important to the commiunity.
This is the reason Sam plans to continue to help Don during .
the next four years while he (Sam) serves as Mayor.
Sam is not ashamed of what his City has done. In fact, he
is proud of the cooperative spirit am.ong the Aldermen, the
comrnunity-at-large (white and black) and City employees
which has made it possible to get where we are and to head
v.'here we're going.
As w'e end this story we realize that the little group of
people out there who say, "d Sam." don't really care a




1. Was the City capable of meeting the strikers' initial
demands ?
2. How vital is the function played by the sanitation workers
in the overall city administration?
3. Do you think that the City exploits waste collection workers?
Are they paid a fair wage?
4. Do you think the waste collectors are being used by the
union to advance the union's own causes?
5. Do you think the 5-day incentive offer would work if adopted?
Why is it necessary?
QUESTIONS: UNION OFFICIALS
1. Do you think the plight of the waste collectors has improved
as a result of the strike? In what ways?
2. Was the strike motivated by the workers or by the union?
3. Does AFSCME have an overall 'southern strategy' of which the
recent sanitation strikes play a part?
4. Why could the \mion not keep any of the City employees other
than the sanitation employees out on strike?
5. Why did the \anion negotiators find themselves agreeing to
contract terms with the City that were unacceptable to the
rank-and-file?
6. Why was it necessary for the International AFSCME President
to intervene in the Atlanta strike?
7. Why didn't the union take out ads in the City's newspapers
to counter Mayor Massell's charges rather than resorting to
fly sheets and union newsletters?
QUESTIONS; WASTE COLLECTORS
1. Why did you choose to become a waste collector? Do you
enjoy your work? What is the least pleaseint aspect of your
job?
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QUESTIONS: WASTE COLLECTORS (CONT'D)
2. Would you recommend a job like yours to a friend who was
out of work?
3. Are you satisfied with the outcome of the strike?
4. Were you prepared to accept the City's increase in the
minimum wage and the $5,000 life insurance policy? How
about the $5.00 bonus for the full five-day work week?
5. Do you think there were racial overtones to the strike?
6. Do you think that racial discrimination is a factor in the
operation of the sanitation division? Does the City exploit
sanitation workers?
7. Did you receive a subsidy from the union during the strike?
If so, how much?
8. Do you think that the workers could have won an increase in
pay without the mion? Do you belong to the union?
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